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Human experience of temporal durations exhibits a multi-regional structure, with more or less distinct boundaries,
or horizons, on the scale of physical duration. The inner horizons are imposed by perceptual thresholds for
simultaneity (≈ 3 ms) and temporal order (≈ 30 ms), and are determined by the dynamical properties of the neural
substrate integrating sensory information. Related to the inner horizon of experienced time are perceptual or
cognitive “moments.” Comparative data on autokinetic times suggest that these moments may be relatively
invariant (≈ 102 ms) across a wide range of species. Extension of the “sensible present” (≈ 3 s) defines an
intermediate horizon, beyond which the generic experience of duration develops. The domain of immediate
duration experience is delimited by the ultimate outer horizon at about ≈102 s, as evidenced by analysis of duration
reproduction experiments (reproducibility horizon), probably determined by relaxation times of “neural
accumulators.” Beyond these phenomenal horizons, time is merely cognitively (re)constructed, not actually
experienced or “perceived,” a fact that is frequently ignored by contemporary time perception research. The
nyocentric organization of time experience shows an interesting analogy with the egocentric organization of
space, suggesting that structures of subjective space and time are derived from active motion as a common
experiential basis.
Keywords: autokinetic time, dual klepsydra model, duration reproduction, phenomenal horizon, psychophysics,
subjective time, temporal experience
La experiencia humana de las duraciones temporales exhibe una estructura multi-regional, con fronteras, u
horizontes, más o menos definidos, en la escala de la duración física. Los umbrales perceptivos de la simultaneidad
(≈3 ms) y el orden temporal (≈30 ms) imponen los horizontes internos y los determinan las propiedades dinámicas
del substrato neuronal que integra la información sensorial. Los “momentos” preceptuales o cognitivos se relacionan
con el horizonte interno del tiempo experimentado. Los datos comparativos sobre tiempos autoquinéticos sugieren
que estos momentos pueden ser relativamente invariantes  (≈102 ms) a través de una amplia variedad de
especies. La extensión del “presente sensible” (≈3 s) define un horizonte intermedio, a partir del cual se desarrolla
la experiencia genérica de la duración. El dominio de experiencia de duración inmediata es delimitado por el
último horizonte externo en aproximadamente ≈102 s, como demuestra el análisis de los experimentos de la
reproducción de la duración (la reproducibilidad del horizonte), probablemente determinado por los tiempos de
relajación de los “acumuladores neuronales.” Más allá de estos horizontes fenomenológicos, el tiempo meramente
se (re)construye cognitivamente, no es experimentado ni “percibido”, un hecho que a menudo es ignorado por
la investigación contemporánea de la percepción del tiempo. La organización niocéntrica de la experiencia del
tiempo muestra una interesante analogía con la organización egocéntrica del espacio, sugiriendo que las
estructuras de espacio y tiempo subjetivos se derivan del movimiento activo como una base experimental común.
Palabras clave: tiempo autoquinético, modelo dual klepsidra, reproducción de la duración, horizonte fenomenológico,
psicofísica, tiempo subjetivo, experiencia temporal
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Introduction
“We are confounded and perplexed about time,” wrote
George Berkeley (1730/1996) in a letter to his friend Samuel
Johnson. During the following centuries, discussions and
speculations on the nature of time demonstrated the truth
of Berkeley’s words. Time has often been called a
“problem,” even a “mystery” (Nichols, 1891) or an “enigma”
(Boslough, 1990). It seems, however, that most aspects of
the so-called “problem of time” originate from the
incongruence between the concept of time as a measurable
continuum as used in science and technology, and the
experience of temporal order and temporal relations as
immediately given to our consciousness.
Perceptual Horizons
The present paper1 focuses on the multi-regional structure
of the experience of time, and on the experimental evidence
for the “horizons” separating these regions. The term horizon
is borrowed from phenomenological philosophy, especially
from the late Edmund Husserl (1937/1976) and his analyses
of the structure of the pre-scientific “life-world” (Lebenswelt).
Briefly, “horizons [are] not merely open areas of decreasing
clarity, but parts of the comprehensive horizon of a world
as their encompassing frame of reference, without which
any account of even a single perception would be
incomplete.” (Spiegelberg, 1994, p. 146).
In our usage, “horizon” signifies a boundary defining a
region with a certain experiential characteristic. The metaphoric
origin of the notion is obvious: Referring to the visual
experience of the world, “horizon” denotes the boundary
separating the spatial region accessible to direct visual
perception from the space “beyond.” Beyond the horizon, there
is space containing objects merely known to be there,
accessible to cognitive reconstruction and symbolic
representation (e.g., by a map), but never actually seen: with
a change of the observer’s position, some objects enter the
visual field while others disappear beyond the horizon. A
somewhat paradoxical fact about the visual horizon, revealed
by phenomenological analysis, is that the horizon itself is both
seen and is not seen. It is seen insofar as it is an identifiable
element of the visual experience—but we cannot say that we
really see the horizon in the same sense as we see all other
things within the horizon. We can at best say that the visual
horizon is an asymptotic boundary of visual experience.
In the field within the given horizon we may differentiate
embedded regions of varying distinctness of perception,
reflecting the well-known ego-centric organization of
subjective space. With decreasing physical distance from
the observer’s body, the structure of experienced space
becomes increasingly complicated; for example, at spatial
locations closer to the visual organ than punctus proximus,
the correlation between haptic and optic experience becomes
blurred and finally lost. Then the ultimate boundary of
possible visual experience is the surface of the visual organ
itself, the eye. The eye is never seen by itself; 2 its central
role in visual perception is indicated only indirectly, from
an allocentric perspective. The eye’s location in space sets
an impenetrable internal horizon on our visual experience.
Physical versus “Psychological” Time
From these preliminary remarks on the structure of
experienced space, we proceed to that of experienced time.
What is its relation to the dimension of time in physics?
Time in physics is an instrumental prescription, constructing
a map of an ordered series of events onto the continuum of
real numbers, A → tA , B → tB , etc. Physical duration is
the measure of time elapsed between two events A and B,
dAB = | tB – tA |, which can be any non-negative number.
Local simultaneity3 of events is equivalent to the statement
that their time instants are identical, that is, dAB = 0. All
this seems self-evident; however, the apparent evidence
makes us easily forget that this is not an empirical fact but
rather an a priori condition4 for a construction of “physical
time” as a continuum. This abstract construct provides a
useful concept—for example, we can apply arithmetic
operations on time indices—but it does not reflect the
intrinsic structure of experienced time. As shown in the
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1 Part of this material was presented at the conference Towards a Science of Consciousness, Copenhagen, Denmark, August 17-20, 2005.
2 As noted by L. Wittgenstein in his Tractatus: “[D]as Auge siehst du wirklich nicht. Und nichts am Gesichtsfeld läßt darauf schließen,
daß es von einem Auge gesehen wird.” (Wittgenstein, 1918/1984, §5.633). – “You really do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual
field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.” – This phenomenological observation serves Wittgenstein as a metaphor for his notion
of the metaphysical subject as an ultimate boundary of the experienced world: “die Grenze – nicht ein Teil – der Welt” (op.cit., §5.641).
In the following we shall see that this applies to time as well: We will arrive at a boundary where the worldly notions of temporal order
and durations lose their sense.
3 Here, “local” means that distinct events occur within a unitary field of perception so that spatial distances do not play any role.
4 For Kant (1787/1998), time (as well as space) is primarily not a concept but rather a form of intuition (Anschauung), a necessary
prerequisite of organization of perceptions. From this point of view, the expression “experience of time” is logically deficient and rather
misleading. In a vein similar to the Kantian thought, we could well say that the concept of time in physics is not an observable but rather
a form of organization of physical observations. Our usage of the expression “a priori” thus refers to the axiomatic basis of physics, not
to the “a priori” of primary intuition. 
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forthcoming sections, studies in perception and judgment
of temporal relations reveal regions of qualitatively different
temporal experience, bounded by more or less distinct
horizons; in particular, experienced time has no “null point”
equivalent to zero physical duration.
These observations, however, should not be interpreted
in a straightforward manner as empirically determined
properties of a different, non-physical entity. Some authors
(e.g., Cohen, 1964; Lehmann, 1967; and others) held the
view that “psychological time” is something essentially
different from “physical time,” thus suggesting a sort of
substance dualism. However, this proposal did not contribute
anything positive to our understanding of human experience
of time; it only polluted the universe of discourse with new,
mysterious entities. A pragmatic approach, combining
phenomenological and psychophysical methods, may be
more promising and productive (cf. Wackermann, 2005). In
particular, such interdisciplinary studies should shed light
on the constitution of the “objective” time out of the
temporal aspect of “subjective” experience.
Inner Horizons of Temporal Experience
The concept of the horizon as the “boundary defining a
region of a certain experiential characteristic” (Section 1.1)
shows some similarity with the concept of threshold
commonly used in sensory physiology and psychophysics.5
Determination of thresholds, that is, minimal durations
required for a certain temporal experience to occur, may
thus provide experimental evidence for horizons of temporal
experience.
Thresholds of Simultaneity and Temporal Order
Temporal experience is primarily experience of succession.
The relations of temporal order between events, “A occurs
before B,” or “A occurs after B,” constitute the most
elementary form of temporal judgment, preceding a metrical
concept of time scale. Our notion of time as a perfectly
ordered universe of events implies that any two events, A and
B, are comparable as to their temporal order. If A occurs
neither before B nor after B, then the events A and B are
simultaneous. These axiomatic foundations are a matter of
logic; only physical conditions of experience of simultaneity
or temporal order are subject to empirical research.
Experimental data shows that two stimuli have to be
separated by a minimum time interval to be perceived as
non-simultaneous; this fusion threshold is about ≈3 ms for
acoustic stimuli, ≈10 ms for visual and tactile stimuli.
However, a time interval of ≈20-40 ms between the two
stimuli is required to indicate their relative order; this order
threshold is reportedly independent of sensory modality
(Pöppel, 1978, 1997). The existence of two distinct
thresholds for two different aspects of temporal
discrimination is usually interpreted as evidence for multiple
brain mechanisms being involved: one responsible for the
integration of a unitary percept, another for determination
of succession between different percepts.
In the logical scheme sketched above, for any two events
that are not simultaneous, one must occur either before or
after the other, that is, their order is determined. Interestingly,
this is not the case in human perception; two stimuli
separated by a time longer than the fusion threshold but
shorter than the order threshold produce two distinct
perceptual events, order of which, however, is not uniquely
determined. Concerning this relative indeterminacy,
Atmanspacher and Filk (2003) proposed an explanative
approach based on generalized quantum theory, a “temporal
double-slit scenario” in which discrimination and
sequentialization of events are considered as complementary
(non-commuting) observables.
Taking abstraction from neurobiological or neurophysical
interpretations, and focusing on the phenomenological
characteristics, we may denote the thresholds of simultaneity
and sequential order as the first and second inner horizons
of temporal experience. As is typical for perceptual horizons,
counter-intuitive or puzzling illusory phenomena can be
observed in the vicinity of these inner horizons. The
“temporal displacement” (Zeitverschiebung), described first
by Wundt, belongs to this category. Vicario (2003) described
temporal displacement in perception of tonal sequences
(inversion of high/low tones) occurring at a tone duration
of 160 ms—that is, far away from the order threshold for
elementary stimuli. Recently, Morrone, Ross, and Burr
(2005) reported inversion of temporal order between two
events separated by 100 ms, if the pair of events preceded
a saccadic eye movement by a period of –70 to –30 ms. 
All these findings indicate how vulnerable, fragile, and
prone to disintegration temporal experience is in peri-
horizontal regions (sub-second domain). The spectacular
phenomena of order indeterminacy or order reversal may
be interesting, and their interpretations may entrain new
insights into the brain’s functioning. However, it is
questionable how much or little their study contributes to
our understanding of real-life temporal experience.
5 The apparent similarity should not obscure the essential difference: Thresholds are conceived as properties of the biological or
psychophysical systems under study; horizons are features of the perceptual situations in their entirety. Moreover, thresholds are usually
determined directly, varying a physical property of the stimulus on a one-dimensional continuum, whereas horizons may be given indirectly,
as limiting values or singularities in a multi-dimensional variety of physical characteristics of the perceptual situation.
“Perceptual Moments” and the Question of Internal
Time Scales
What is the duration of an elementary perception, that
is to say, of a perceptual event corresponding to a point-
like physical event? This problem has a long tradition in
sensory physiology and experimental psychology. For
example, Fröhlich (1923) described the flash lag
phenomenon and estimated from its magnitude the duration
of elementary visual sensation (Empfindungszeit) to be
40–150 ms. Efron (1972) estimated the minimal perceptual
duration to be about 150–160 ms. The importance of these
findings with respect to understanding central mechanisms
of temporal experience is problematic. Thus Patterson
criticized the concept of perceptual moment, and pointed
out that studies by Allport, Efron and Lee, etc. “are not
relevant to these models [of perceptual moment] because
the studies involved the investigation of peripheral, sensory
mechanisms whereas the models propose the operation of
a central intermittency” (Patterson, 1990).
Proceeding from peripheral sensory subsystems to central
representation and processing of sensory information, we
may rephrase the question of perceptual moments to that of
“mental tempo.” More generally and in line with the
cognitivist façon de parler, the problem concerns
characteristic time scales of internal information processing,
and their relation to temporal experience. This problem has
provoked speculative thoughts throughout the course of
many centuries.
It was again Berkeley who raised the question, “What
if succession of ideas were swifter, what if slower?”
(Berkeley 1707/1996, §B16), implying that the tempo of
succession of mental contents determines the time base of
experience. This followed from Berkeley’s principal tenet
that “nothing but ideas [are] perceivable” (op. cit., §B50),
backed up by the observation that “in some dreams
succession of ideas is swifter than at other times” (op. cit.,
§B39).
In a similar vein, von Baer (1864)6 held that “there is
no doubt that a human being can measure nature only with
herself, in terms of space as well as of time” (p. 267), and
he even extrapolated this idea to the entire realm of animated
beings: “the inner life of a human or of an animal can during
the same external time [period] pass faster or slower, and
this inner life is the standard with which we measure time
when we observe [processes in] Nature.” (op. cit., pp. 257-
258)7
We find thoughts of a similar sort in the philosophical
writings of Bernhard Riemann:8
It seems that different thought processes differ mainly
with respect to their temporal rhythm. If plants are
animated [beings], then hours and days must be for them
what seconds are for us; the corresponding time interval
for the soul of the Earth, at least for its external activity,
embraces perhaps many thousands of years (Riemann,
1953/1958, p. 518).
In the modern literature, the problem of the time scale
of cognitive processes is usually set in the context of a
hypothetically discrete structure of mental activity, or
“psychological time” as such (e.g., Geissler, 1987; Shallice,
1964; Stroud, 1954). For example, Pöppel (1978, p. 715)
hypothesized “central temporal processing units or subjective
time quanta with a duration in the range 20–40 ms.” Closely
related is the hypothesis of an oscillatory basis of organismic
time (e.g., Dehaene, 1993; Pöppel, 1972; Treisman, 1963),
known under the suggestive title of “internal clock;” the
period of the clock determines the duration of an elementary
time quantum.9 Arguments supporting these hypotheses are
usually derived from experiments similar to those proposed
for the determination of perceptual moments. Experimental
neurophysiology may also provide supportive data. For
example, spatial analysis of the time series of brain electrical
fields reveals a discrete structure in the brain’s activity
consisting of a temporal sequence of so-called “micro-states”
(Lehmann, Ozaki, & Pal, 1987); the durations of these micro-
states are of the order of magnitude ≈100 ms. It has been
hypothesized that the micro-states represent elementary steps
of information processing, the “building blocks of
consciousness” or, metaphorically, the “atoms of thought”
(Lehmann, 1990).
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6 K.E. von Baer (1792-1846), German-Estonian biologist, renowned for his work in embryology (discovery of egg-cell in vertebrates)
and developmental biology, a “forerunner and critic of the theory of natural selection” (Kull, 1999).
7 In German original: “[D]as innere Leben eines Menschen oder Thiers [kann] in derselben äußern Zeit rascher oder langsamer
verlaufen, und dieses innere Leben ist das Grundmaaß, mit welchem wir bei Beobachtung der Natur die Zeit messen.”
8 G.F.B. Riemann (1826-1866), German mathematician. Quoted text in German original: “Die verschiedenen Denkprocesse scheinen
sich hauptsächlich zu unterscheiden durch ihren zeitlichen Rhythmus. Wenn die Pflanzen beseelt sind, so müssen Stunden und Tage für
sie sein, was für uns Secunden sind; der entsprechende Zeitraum für die Erdseele, wenigstens für ihre Thätigkeit nach aussen, umfasst
vielleicht viele Jahrtausende.”
9 The “internal clock model” and related theories (cf. Grondin, 2001) present a complex of problems that cannot be treated adequately
in the present paper. For a criticism of the technomorphic concept of the “internal clock”, see Wackermann and Ehm (2006), also
Wackermann (2005), p. 196.
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Autokinetic Invariance
Speculations about the time scale of inner experience of
infra-human species are beyond the limits of experimental
verification. However, biology’s observational data may
provide some information about time scales of interactions
between organisms and their physical environments.
The bodily size of an organism determines a natural
“length unit” of its “action-world,” or Umwelt, as defined
by von Uexküll (1928). This is to say, the typical body
size determines the scale of spatial extensions of relevant
objects, and distances to those objects. We will call the
ratio τ = l /v, that is, the time required to traverse the
organism’s own body length l at its maximal locomotion
speed v, “autokinetic time.”10 It is reasonable to assume
that intra-organismic information processing, from sensory
input to motor output, must proceed at rates comparable
with the rate of change in the organism’s perception/action
field induced by the organism’s active motion. Hence the
autokinetic time τ may provide a rough estimate of the
time scale of intra-organismic information processing.
Figure 1 shows length–velocity data for 29 different
animal species, plotted in log-log coordinates: The
autokinetic times τ are confined to a narrow range
between 30 to 300 ms, with the geometric mean ≈100 ms.
This relative11 invariance indicates that elementary
information processing times are universally in the order
of magnitude of 10–1 s; a value which is, interestingly,
in agreement with estimates of “perceptual moments” or
“brain functional microstates” quoted in the preceding
section.
Of course, the autokinetic invariance is not to be
interpreted as a manifestation of harmonie préétablie
between species. It is merely one of many allometric
relations known in comparative biology (Charnov, 1993),
and should be interpretable on a basis of biophysics, in
terms of intra-organismic energy production, its translation
to kinetic energy via motor effectors, etc. It is nonetheless
important that autokinetic times can be specified for
behaving organisms solely on the basis of observational
data, independently of our attributing “consciousness” or
“subjective experience” to the species (cf. Baars, 2005;
Griffin & Speck, 2004), and interpreted as characteristic
times of information processing.
Outer Horizons of Temporal Experience
The “Sensible Present”
The notion of the sensible present12 was coined by
William James to express the fact that the present “now” is
not a dimensionless point in time but seems to have a certain
extension: “[t]he knowledge of some other part of the stream
[of consciousness], past or future, near or remote, is always
mixed in with our knowledge of the present thing” (James,
1890, p. 606). In a succession of events, the contents of the
present awareness is a subset of immediately past events, as
“objects fade out of consciousness slowly” (op. cit., p. 607).
In a well-known Jamesian metaphor, “the practically cognized
present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain
breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which
we look in two directions into time” (op. cit., p. 609).
10 From the Greek αυτο = self, κινησις = motion; this term has no relation to “autokinetic illusions” (Adams, 1912) in visual
perception.
11 The qualifier “relative” should be understood in terms of the orders of magnitude: The ratios τ are concentrated in the range 10–1±1/2 s,
that is, in a zone of width 1:10, while the lengths and velocities cover a range of about 1:106.
12 Also referred to as “specious present,” a term which James in fact had borrowed from E.R. Clay. Other authors also used different
terms, such as “subjective present,” “presence time,” etc. (cf. Pöppel, 1978, p. 723, and references therein).
Figure 1. Maximal locomotion velocity, vmax, plotted vs. body length,
l, for a variety of 29 animal species (open circles; data from
McMahon & Bonner, 1983). The dashed diagonal line indicates
autokinetic time τ = l/v = 100 ms; the parallel dotted lines indicate
times τ from 10 to 1000 ms, with step factor √10 ≈ 3.162. Most data
points are concentrated within a narrow band from ≈30 to ≈300 ms.
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Referring to experimental results of Wundt and
collaborators, James estimated duration of the sensible
present to be from 3 to 12 s: “[t]he specious present has
[...] a vaguely vanishing backward and forward fringe; but
its nucleus is probably the dozen seconds or less that have
just elapsed” (op. cit., p. 613). The elements leaving and
entering the present awareness were considered by James
as “the germs of memory and expectation,” or plainly “the
retrospective and the prospective sense of time” (op. cit., p.
606), a concept reminding of retention and protention
revealed by Husserl’s (1928/2000) phenomenological
analyses of time consciousness.13
James’ concept of the sensible present has been generally
accepted. Contemporary research into time perception and
timing behavior has surprisingly little to add to it, except
of an updated terminology and an extended experimental
database. In the modern information-processing parlance,
the sensible present is usually interpreted as a result of the
temporal integration of information (Pöppel, 1978, 2004;
von Steinbüchel, Wittmann, & Szelag, 1999). Experimental
methods used to determine the temporal extension of the
“integration window” include, for example, grouping of beat
trains into perceptible units, or perception of
ambiguous/multi-stable visual or acoustic stimuli. The
reported results satisfactorily converge in the range from 2
to 3 s. Also, auxiliary data from areas as diverse as
neuropsychology, neurolinguistics, and cultural anthropology
are being reported to corroborate the special status of the
2–3 s range (Pöppel, 2004, p. 299; von Steinbüchel et al.,
1999, p. 175).
The experience of temporal order is preserved within the
sensible present, but requires active attention: “to sensible
perception, its elements are inseparable, although attention
looking back may easily decompose the experience, and
distinguish its beginning from its end” (James, 1890, p. 610).
Exceeding the critical duration of ≈3 s causes an erosion and
disintegration of perceived unity in time. Discrete sensory
events or motor actions separated by shorter intervals can be
easily integrated to a unitary experience of rhythm; with
increasing interval, the experience of emptiness occurs,
perceivably separating one event or action from the subsequent
one, and thus imposing a definite temporal order on them.
Seen “from the other side” (i.e., that of established
temporal order), the sensible present occurs as a “melting
zone” in the progression of time: “although we are aware
of successiveness, we cannot give the items in a reliable
order” (Dobbs, 1972). The boundary of the sensible present
thus occurs as a relative or intermediate horizon, the meaning
of which depends on whether we approach the horizon from
within or from without. Only by transgressing this horizon
do we enter the domain of perceivable duration in the proper
sense of the word.
Time Reproduction and the Dual-Klepsydra Model
An interesting aspect of duration experience is revealed
by experiments with reproduction of temporal durations. In
a typical time reproduction task (TRT), the participant is
presented a sensorily perceivable (e.g., visual) stimulus of
duration s, controlled by the experimenter. After an
interstimulus interval (ISI), w, the stimulus is presented
again, and the participant’s task is to indicate (e.g., by a
pressing a response key) the moment at which the duration
of the latter stimulus is equal to the duration of the former
stimulus. The TRT is one of the classical methods of the
experimental psychology of time (Eisler, 2003; Richards,
1964; Vierordt, 1868; Woodrow, 1930), and reportedly
produces smaller error variance than other methods, that is,
duration production or magnitude estimation (Bindra &
Waksberg, 1956).
It is, however, not quite clear what the reproduction
method really measures. The mean reproduced durations, r,
plotted as a function of the stimulus duration, s, show
typically (a) under-production with respect to the
chronometrically correct response, r = s, and (b) a non-linear
course with a negative curvature, indicating progressive
shortening of the response with respect to the stimulus s
(Figure 3; Wackermann, Späti, & Ehm, 2005). The standard
“internal clock model” with a constant pacemaker frequency
does not easily account for this phenomenon. Eisler’s (1975)
“parallel clock model,” devised specifically for duration
reproduction, does account for the non-linear course of the
reproduction response but only by piecewise linear
approximation.
13 How much, if anything, Husserl owes to James is a question beyond the scope of the present paper. The important contribution of
both authors was the discovery of the co-presence of past (and to some extent, future) in the present “now” as a constitutive element of
subjective consciousness of time. Husserl’s “diagram of experienced time” (Husserl, 1928, p. 23) shows a striking parallelism with the
graphic representation of co-present past proposed by Ward and mentioned by James on p. 629. What Husserl denotes as the “horizon
of the past” (Vergangenheitshorizont) occurs in James’ account as “a sort of perspective projection of past objects upon present consciousness”
(op. cit., p. 630). — However, we should not overlook the novel moment of Husserl’s phenomenology, which was radically innovative
in searching for apodictic evidence solely in pure phenomena, without referring to results of positive sciences (psychology). The
contemporary trend to merge phenomenology with natural sciences (Varela, 1999) would appear from the radical Husserlian perspective
as a rather suspect and counter-productive move.
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The progressive shortening of reproduction responses is
predicted by the dual-klepsydra model (DKM), which is
based on two linear inflow/outflow systems (“leaky
accumulators” or “klepsydrae”; Wackermann & Ehm, 2006;
Wackermann, Ehm, & Späti, 2003). The model yields a so-
called “klepsydraic reproduction function” (KRF), 
krf(s,w) = κ–1 ln (1 + η (1 – e–κs) e–κw) , (1)
where s = the original stimulus duration, w = interstimulus
interval, parameter κ stands for the leakage rate of both
accumulators, and η = i1/i2 is the ratio of inflows to the 1st
and 2nd accumulator. (In most experimental situations, we
assume η = 1.) A detailed discussion of the DKM, including
its extension to a stochastic model accounting for
intraindividual response variance, has been given by
Wackermann and Ehm (2006), while a possible neural
implementation of the model is sketched in Wackermann
(2005); see also Jech, Dus #ek, Wackermann, and Vymazal
(2005) for results of a fMRI study supporting the assumption
of the dual-accumulator structure.
The Horizon of Reproducibility
With a fixed ISI, w = const, the KRF becomes a function
of a single argument, s, specifying a theoretical response
curve (TRC) that can be matched against experimental data.
Generally, the TRCs are increasing functions of the stimulus
duration, s, with a negative curvature (Fig. 2), except for
κ → 0, where the KRF becomes a linear function
independent on the ISI, krf(s,w) = ηs. The phenomenon of
the progressive shortening of response times is thus explained
by the model with constant flows, and without any additional
assumptions or corrections. Figure 3 shows a KRF fitted to
TRT data obtained with one individual participant in three
experimental sessions, that yields an estimate of κ = 0.038
s–1. For a model with only one degree of freedom14, this is
a fairly good fit. Estimates of κ from our experiments on
the duration reproduction of visually presented stimuli are
in the order of magnitude of 10–2 s–1 (Späti, 2005), which
is in good agreement with estimates based on data reported
by other authors (cf. Wackermann, 2005, p. 198). The inverse
value, κ–1, specifies the relaxation time of the klepsydrae,
which is of the order of magnitude 101 to 102 s.
The importance of κ–1 as a natural “unit” on the scale
of experienced duration manifests itself in the asymptotic
properties of TRCs. For very long s, the KRF response is
lim s∞ krf(s,w) = κ –1 ln(1 + e–κw) ≤ r∞, (2)
where the limiting value r
∞
≡ κ–1 ln 2 (see Figure 2). This
is a surprising feature of the model; should we expect that
a duration of, say, 1 hour, would be reproduced as 1 minute?
Certainly not; but we should note that “reproduction” of
such an extended duration does not rely on pure duration
experience. It is virtually impossible to maintain the “carrier”
of 1-hour duration in the focus of a subject’s awareness;
14 This and all following estimates of parameter κ were obtained with parameter η fixed to unity.
Figure 2. Theoretical response curves (TRC) predicted by the dual-klepsydra model (DKM) of duration reproduction. — Left (a): TRCs
for varied values of parameters κ = 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03 s–1; (η = 1, w = 0 for all curves). Right (b): “Anatomy” of the TRC (η = 1, w =
0). Both axes labeled in κ–1 units: r
∞
≈ 0.7 κ–1 = asymptotic upper bound of response times; h = krf(κ–1,0) ≈ 0.5 κ–1. The latter can be
used for a rough estimate of κ = (stimulus duration s for which r = s/2)–1; for more precise methods to estimate KRF parameters see
Wackermann and Ehm (2005, App. C).
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other perceptual or internally generated events enter the field
of attention and play the role of temporal cues (Pöppel,
1978). These cues create a frame of reference with respect
to which the subject may cognitively reconstruct the duration
(“it must have been about 1 hour”); similar processes may
be involved in a reproduction of long durations.
A closer look at the form of the theoretical KRF (Figure
2) explains the necessity of the transition from the representation
based presumably on continuous accumulation of neural
excitation to another representation: With progressive flattening
of the KRF, discrimination of durations in terms of their virtual
reproduction becomes less and less reliable (Wackermann,
2005, p. 201). We call this upper limit on durations accessible
to live, immediate experience the “horizon of reproducibility.”
As is the case with other perceptual horizons, the horizon is
never actually reached; its existence manifests itself in perception
only indirectly. Based on the interpretation of duration
reproduction experiments and their extrapolation, a plausible
estimate of the position of the horizon on the physical time
scale is 102 s, that is, roughly a few minutes.
“Time Perceived” and “Time Known”
The scope of reproductive memory for temporal durations
thus appears as limited; that is to say, delimited by the outer
horizon. This again was expressed by James who wrote:
Our maximum distinct intuition of duration hardly covers
more than a dozen seconds, while our maximum vague
intuition is probably not more than that of a minute or
so. [...] The duration thus steadily perceived is hardly
more than the “specious present” [...] Its content is in a
constant flux, events dawning into its forward end as
fast as they fade out of its rearward one (James, 1890,
p. 630; italics his).
This description is not quite adequate as it depicts the
sensible present as a sort of “pipeline,” and ignores the
increasing compression of the stream of events in the
reproductive memory, blurring the temporal resolution of
remote events.15 We have shown elsewhere (Wackermann
& Ehm, 2006) that this progressive compression is explained
by a so-called cumulative reproduction function, defined by
means of the KRF (cf. also Wackermann, 2005, p. 201-202,
for a revised version Husserl’s diagram of experienced time,
visualizing the effect of compression of the reproducible
past). Importantly, James further observes that “the
reproduction of an event, after it has once completely dropped
out of the rearward end of the specious present, is an entirely
different psychic fact from its direct perception in the specious
present as a thing immediately past” (loc. cit.).
Metaphorically, we could say that the “pressure of the
accumulated past” makes the fluid stream of events condense
to a solid state, that is, a phenomenologically different mode.
It is this “condensed” mode, in which past events are
represented in the biographic memory, for example, as
elements of narrative account. Representation of very long
time intervals consists of a selection of a subset of discrete,
isolated events upon which a relational structure is defined.
We could say that very large temporal extensions are never
really perceived, only known; the same applies to shorter
durations between events in remote past.16
15 It seems that James does not distinguish clearly between (a) the de-blurring of perceivable order at the frontier of the “sensible
present” period, and (b) the transformation of the perceived temporal order into a definitive order established by the relations known. In
our view (a) and (b) are two qualitatively different phenomena; furthermore, we suggest that it is only within the region between horizons
(a) and (b) that the experience of duration is fully developed.
16 I.M. Havel (2005) in his analyses of structure of experienced time emphasizes this discrete, network-like, relational structure, and
postulates a discontinuous “granular” structure as an essential characteristic of subjective time (“stream of episodes”). Although we are
greatly sympathetic to Havel’s approach and we find numerous meeting points between his and our efforts, our approach is distinctly
different: We are primarily interested in metricization of the region of perceivable durations by means of continuous functions, and we
do not see any compelling reason to introduce discontinuity.
Figure 3. A typical response curve from a time reproduction
experiment (data from Späti, 2005). The figure is based on
aggregated data from three separate sessions with an individual
participant (male, age 49 years), each session comprising 35
reproduction trials. Mean response times (open circles) ±1 SD (error
bars) are shown as a function of stimulus duration, s, varied from
3 to 24 s, with constant ISI w = 1.25 s. The diagonal dotted line
indicates the “chronometrically correct” response. The grey curve
shows the theoretical response curve (TRC) fitted to the experimental
data: κ = 0.038 s–1, which corresponds to relaxation time ≈26 s.
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Summarizing: the domain of “live experience” of
temporal duration is a relatively narrow region, extending
from the intermediate horizon of the sensible present (2-3
s) to the ultimate outer horizon, the horizon of actual
reproducibility (≈102 s). Very short and very long physical
durations are accessible only in a cognitive act but are not
directly perceivable. 
Concluding remarks
Is there a Unitary Dimension of Subjective Time?
The objective of this article is to draw attention to the
notion of experiential horizon as a productive and
indispensable concept for the understanding time experience.
Of course, the phenomenal differences between different
regions of physical durations have been known for a very
long time. As one among many authors, Pöppel (1978)
emphasized the need for a “taxonomy of ‘elementary time
experiences,’” and insisted that “time perception can be
explained only if the different aspects of subjective time are
first identified, before asking the question of how these
relate to each other” (Pöppel, 1978, p. 726).17
However, if the modes of temporal experience
corresponding to different regions, delimited by their
respective horizons (Figure 4), are qualitatively different,
the attempts to establish a unitary “psychology of time” are
rather questionable. What have such disparate topics as
perceptual moments, experienced duration, and time
perspective, in common? Of course, speaking of the physical
“correlates” of these phenomena, we have to refer in all
cases to one and the same dimension of physical time. But
this does not imply the necessity or plausibility of a unitary
dimension of “subjective” or “psychological time;” the latter
remains an unsupported hypothesis.
To give just one example: Eisler reported differences in
duration reproduction between two ethnic groups, native
Swedish and African immigrants living in Sweden—
manifested in different curvatures of their response curves—
and suggested “time perspective [as] a possible explanation:”
in immigrants, “assimilation and separation, or loss of own
culture [...] can form the basis of a short time perspective,
which in turn may lead to short reproductions of duration”
17 We disagree about the latter point, and maintain that “the question of how these [aspects] relate to each other” is an indispensable
component of “identification” of the aspects of time experience, in terms of phenomenological or psychophysical regularities.
Figure 4. Characteristic times of organismic processes plotted on a logarithmic scale of physical duration. — Periodic processes: Brain
oscillations (frequency bands γ, β, α, ϑ, and δ); peripheral physiology (HR = heart-beat rate, resp = respiration); locomotion (walk =
pacing period). — Transient processes: autokinetic times τ for various non-human species (cf. Fig. 1); relaxation times κ–1 of hypothetical
neural accumulators, estimated from experiments on duration reproduction. — Grey bars in the background indicate horizons of temporal
experience. From left to right: fusion threshold (FT); temporal order threshold (OT); sensible present (SP); reproducibility horizon (RH)
suggested as the outer horizon of duration experience.
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(Eisler, 2003, p. 14; italics ours). This interpretation assumes
a causal relation between two different experiential regions,
the region of one’s life perspective, that is, future-oriented
concepts or projects (Existenzentwürfe), with a horizon on
the time scale of months or years, and the region of
experienced duration, delimited by the reproducibility
horizon. There is, however, no convincing evidence for a
psychological or psychophysical mechanism for the alleged
causal relation.18
Primacy of Duration: Comments on “Time
Perception” Research
The problematic status of “psychological time” invokes
serious doubts about so-called “time perception.” In fact,
time perception is a plain misnomer: we do not perceive
time as we do perceive, say, light or sound. Woodrow, in
his review of research into time perception, put this clearly
when he wrote: “Time is not a thing that, like an apple,
may be perceived. Stimuli and patterns of stimuli occupy
physical time; and we react to such stimuli by perceptions,
judgments, comparisons, estimates, etc.” (Woodrow, 1951,
p. 1235). In a similar vein, Pöppel plainly stated that “there
is no such thing as time perception” (Pöppel, 1978, loc.
cit.).19
As demonstrated above, durations immediately
accessible to perceptual experience are delimited by the
absolute inner and outer horizons; the phenomenon of
sensible present imposes another, intermediate horizon, thus
narrowing limit the region of actually perceivable durations
(Figure 4). The region between this relative inner horizon
and the absolute outer horizon extends from ≈3 s to ≈102 s.
It is only within this region that we can speak, with a proper
caution, about time perception—or, more properly, about
perception of temporal extension of sensory events. This
is in agreement with Woodrow’s (1930) observation:
The subjects seemed all to be of the opinion that, if there
is any experience which deserves to be called the
perception of time, that such experience begins to
become definite only at 1.5 to 6 sec, and continues as
much the same quality of experience throughout all the
longer intervals (p. 494).20
By contrast, contemporary research into time perception
tends to operate in the sub-second domain (cf. Grondin,
2001), that is, beyond the horizon of duration qua temporal
extension. Is this trend towards extremely short durations
due to the lack of experimenters’ patience? Or does it
indicate a shift in the very concept of time perception? The
illegitimate extension of the notion of perception beyond
the limits of what is actually perceivable is methodologically
questionable, and entails the danger of a gross category
error.21
A simple analogy may illustrate our point: The
biological response of a human organism to electromagnetic
radiation (EMR) involves many different mechanisms. For
example, exposure of the skin to infra-red radiation causes
thermal sensations; exposure to ultra-violet radiation may
cause changes in skin pigmentation; etc. The visual
sensation of light is thus merely one among many effects
of EMR, confined to a relatively narrow range of
wavelengths. It is physically correct to say that infra-red,
ultra-violet, and visible light are various forms of EMR,
differing “only” in their wavelengths—but it would be
utterly wrong to subsume all of the above-mentioned effects
(thermal, biochemical, etc.) under the common heading of
“color perception.” Psychophysical effects of EMR of
different wavelengths are phenomenally different, and these
differences justify the partitioning of the continuum of
wavelengths to regions separated by “horizons of visibility.”
As we have drawn above (Section 3.3) a distinction
between durations perceived and durations known, we
could say that infra-red or ultra-violet light has no
“perceivable color,” only a “known color.” Consequently,
we should not confound regions of different durations only
because they belong to the same abstract physical
continuum “time.”
18 The characteristic times, κ–1, estimated by a fit of the KRF to Eisler’s data, were approximately 60 s for the native Swedish population,
and 30 s for the African population (Wackermann & Ehm, 2005). It is questionable whether values of this order of magnitude could be
meaningfully related to the alleged differences in “time perspective.”
19 Interestingly, these views did not prevent the cited authors from publishing overviews of the topics under the traditional heading of
“time perception.” Cf. also footnote 4.
20 Woodrow reported experiments with the reproduction of temporal durations varied at 13 levels, in a wide range from 200 ms to 30 s.
Note that the geometric mean of the subjective limits for an experience of duration, as specified by Woodrow’s subjects, is 3 s (cf.
Figure 4).
21 In an informal discussion at the 20th annual meeting of the International Society for Psychophysics (Coimbra, October 2004), the
author raised the question about experimenters’ choice of durations of interest. An answer given by one of the leading researchers in time
perception was that stimulus durations in the sub-second range “prevent subjects from counting.” This anecdote makes the problem caused
by the neglect of the fact of experiential horizons even more strikingly evident. Can we really speak about the experience of a duration
so short that the participants do not even have time enough to utter “one, two” in their minds?
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Spatio-Temporal Matrix of Life and the Origin of
Time Horizons
Analogy between spatial and temporal horizons. Our
analyses reveal the nyo-centric22 structure of experienced
time, analogous to the ego-centric structure of experienced
space. The body’s surface, a flexible and variable, but
impenetrable boundary to one’s action space, determines
the innermost horizon of the primary experience of space,
based upon elementary haptic/motor acts. Similarly, the
temporal order threshold determines the innermost horizon
of the primary experience of time, arising from elementary
perceptual acts. Positions of these horizons on physical scales
of length (space) and duration (time) may be approximately
related by the autokinetic invariance (Section 2.3).
This analogy can be further extended: The body’s actual
position is always in the center23 of a space region that is
“immediately attainable” by means of simple locomotor acts;
the boundary of this region sets an “intermediate horizon”
to the experienced space. We may see a parallel to the
attainability horizon in the temporal horizon of the “subjective
present” (Section 3.1), presumably resulting from “temporal
integration” (Pöppel, 1978, 2004) of a stream of events into
a wholeness of the momentary content of consciousness.
Both intermediate horizons, the spatial and the temporal,
have in common a certain flexibility and relative permeability,
depending on the level of activation, vigilance, etc.
In comparing the perception of duration to the visual
perception of distances, James (1890) remarked that,
[t]he former have a much narrower range; the time-sense
may be called a myopic organ [...] The eye sees rods,
acres, even miles, at a single glance [...] The units of
duration, on the other hand, which the time-sense is able
to take in at a single stroke, are groups of a few seconds
(p. 611).
We would rather say that the minimum extension of the
sensible present corresponds to a punctus proximus, defining
an intermediate horizon within which a definite temporal
order blurs and melts.
Finally, a model-based analysis of experiments with the
reproduction of temporal durations reveals the ultimate outer
horizon of “live experience” of duration, that is, the
reproducibility horizon (Section 3.3). It is at present unclear
what should correspond to this horizon in the domain of
space. It would be worth exploring experimentally whether
distances traveled and reproduced by active locomotion
show are related by “reproduction functions” similar to those
demonstrated for temporal durations.24 If this is the case,
another interesting question would be whether there are
invariance relations between space and time scale constants,
holding at the outer horizons of spatial and temporal
experience, similarly to the autokinetic invariance relation
holding at the inner horizons.
Motion as the proto-phenomenon constituting spatial
and temporal relations. Bergson (1888) in his Essay
proclaimed the irreducibility of experienced time to the
“mechanical” time of physics; in the same vein, he refuted
spatial metaphors for time as inappropriate. This categorical
separation of space and time seems untenable. Besides the
formal analogy between abstract, mathematical, space and
time (Mach, 1906, p. 100), there is also an evident analogy
in the structure of experienced space and time, explained
in the preceding subsection. We may consider active motion
of an animate organism as the link between those two aspects
of experience, the spatial and the temporal, or more properly,
as the proto-phenomenal basis upon which spatial and
temporal notions are being constituted.
This concept reminds us of Minkowski’s (1909) famous
words on “space by itself, and time by itself, vanishing into
shadows and only a kind of union of the two being
preserved.”25 Assuming the spatio-temporal matrix of organic
life as the unitary basis of space and time, we realize the need
for an integrative discipline transcending classical
psychophysics, a kind of “ethophysics” or “ecophysics.” In
this integrative discipline, observational regularities such as,
for example, the above-stated autokinetic invariance may play
a role similar to the “laws” in the traditional psychophysics.
The origin of spatial and temporal order in the biological
proto-phenomenon of motion was latently contained in
Berkeley’s lucid remark: “Swiftness of ideas compared with
that of motion shows the wisdom of God” (Berkeley
1707/1996, §B15). Whether we interpret the cognitive
embedding of living organisms in their environments as a
sign of the Creator’s wisdom or as a result of biological
Evolution—this may remain a matter of one’s
Weltanschauung or religious belief. At least, we could say
that this fact reveals an aspect of the intrinsic rationality of
Nature.
22 From the Greek νυν = “now” (cf. German “nun”).
23
“Center” in the sense of the origin of a possible action, not the geometrical center.
24 No such data are known to the author. If experimental data of this kind exist, the author would be thankful for any reference or
communication.
25 Original German quotation: “Raum für sich und Zeit für sich [sollen] völlig zu Schatten herabsinken und nur noch eine Art Union
der beiden soll Selbständigkeit bewahren.” (Minkowski, 1909, p. 104). However, Minkowski was referring to the consequences of a
newly elaborated mathematical formalism of the relativity theory, whereas we are referring to psychophysical prerequisites of cognitive
acts, out of which the concepts of physics only later arise.
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